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Abstract— Robot Operating System (ROS) 2 is a ground-
up re-design of ROS 1 to support performance critical cyber-
physical systems (CPSs) using the Data Distribution Service
(DDS) middleware. Accordingly, the security of ROS 2 is highly
reliant on the security of its DDS communication protocol. How-
ever, finding a balance between the performance and security
is non-trivial task. Inappropriate security implementations may
cause not only significant loss on performance of the system, but
also security failures in the system. In this paper, we provide
an analysis of the DDS security protocol as well as an overview
on how to find the balance between performance and security.
To accomplish this, we evaluate the latency and throughput
of the communication protocols of ROS 2 in both wired and
wireless networks, and measure the efficiency loss caused by the
enabling of security protocols such as Virtual Private Network
(VPN) and DDS security protocol in ROS 2 in both network
setups. The result can be directly used by robotics developers
to find the optimal and balanced settings of ROS 2 applications.
Additionally, we analyzed the security specification of DDS
using existing security standards and tested the implementation
of the DDS protocol by performing static analysis. The results
of this work can be used to enhance the security of ROS 2.
I. INTRODUCTION
The Robot Operating System (ROS) [1] is one of most
popular frameworks to develop robotics and drones, which
are types of Cyber Physical Systems (CPSs) [2]. ROS 2 is
a ground-up re-design of ROS 1 to support the expanded
scope of robotics that utilize ROS. It moves away from a
design for ideal conditions and move towards middleware
that can support production environments (real-time systems,
non-ideal networks, small embedded platforms, etc.). The
most significant change in design is the abstraction of the
communications middleware implementation. That is, rather
than implementing communication through custom protocols
(e.g., ROSTCP and ROSUDP communicating via XML-
RPC), ROS 2 is built on top of existing middlewares, namely
the Data Distribution Service (DDS) [3].
The DDS protocol is developed for fast communication,
and therefore latency and throughput are critical perfor-
mance parameters within the service. ROS 2 performance
without security (i.e., clear text communication) is already
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well observed and documented by eProsima [4], whilst the
performance with the enabled security functions have not
been thoroughly assessed. As ROS 2 matures into a product
for real world applications, the CPSs that utilize ROS 2 have
significant real world concerns regarding cybersecurity [5],
[6]. Hence, it is important to understand the trade-offs and
risks involved with sacrificing security for performance [7].
The Object Management Group (OMG), who maintains the
standard for DDS, already considers the security of DDS by
providing in-depth security specifications [3]. However, as
we show in this work, there are still inconsistencies between
the specification and resulting implementation in ROS 2.
This research focuses on investigating and characterizing
the performance of ROS 2 with the recently implemented
security mechanisms. We assess the cryptographic algorithms
and their implementations using the standards derived from
NIST SP 800-53 [8], and Federal Information Processing
Standards (FIPS) 140-2 [9] and FIPS 140-2 DTR [10]. Our
tests and analysis mainly focus on the correctness of the
implementation and the key management aspect of the DDS
protocol. In addition, we provide recommendations from our
assessment such as forward secrecy. Finally, we detail aspects
that can potentially make the system vulnerable, e.g., incon-
sistencies between the specification and implementation.
In this work we:
• Perform physical experiments by implementing ROS 2
to measure the latency and throughput performance of
the DDS security functions.
• Build a secure network to compare the performance
effects with the use of a Virtual Private Network (VPN)
versus with the performance effects of the DDS security
protocol, testing in wired and wireless settings.
• Perform static analysis of the eProsima Real Time
Publish Subscribe (RTPS) communication standard, the
default middleware in ROS 2.
• Provide recommendations in terms of specific actions in
the DDS implementation that will resolve the presented
security assessment failures.
An overview of the DDS protocol security specification
is presented in Section II-B. The approach used for physical
analysis and implementation over both wired and wireless
networks is discussed in Section III, while experiments and
results are detailed in Section IV. Finally, static analysis
of the eProsima RTPS middleware for ROS 2 and DDS
implementation recommendations are provided in Section V.
II. BACKGROUND
ROS was initially designed for academic and hobbyist
communities with the intent to create software tools to enable
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robotic development that could be easily shared and reused
[11]. Accordingly, cybersecurity protections were not a focus
(i.e., flawed security is worse than no security) so previous
efforts sought to examine how to include security protections
and their impact [5], [6], [12], [13], [14], [15], [16], [17].
A. ROS and its Security Posture
Despite the lack of built-in cybersecurity protections into
ROS 1, many parties have been keenly intersted in the
adapation of ROS, namely the U.S. Army, with the goal of
improving the cybersecurity posture of the entire framework
and to ensure it is viable for military use [18]. The primary
driver for this adaptation is Department of Defense (DoD)
level guidance pushing for the use of a modular and open
system approach to development and acquisition across all
programs [19]. Given the need for modularity, reuse, and
open architectures [20], ROS meets many of the needs for
Army robotics development, with the important exception of
cybersecurity. Due to the highly sensitive nature of infor-
mation transferred and stored on DoD information systems,
all CPSs that connect to the Global Information Grid must
be extensively reviewed for cybersecurity risks [21]. In
order to leverage the modularity benefits of ROS while
maintaining an acceptable level of cybersecurity risk, ROS-
Military (ROS-M) is being established to have a military
ecosystem for ROS 1 and 2 applications that takes advantage
of current cybersecurity improvement efforts and funding
further development in that domain.
The new version of ROS aims to address the issue of
cybersecurity through two core efforts; connection-oriented
security and application-oriented security (i.e., access control
and auditing). The focus of this work is on the implemen-
tation and performance of ROS 2 based on the developed
connection-oriented security measures. Although, unlike pre-
vious work [17], [14], [12], [22] which aims to analyze or
develop methods of securing communication between ROS
1 nodes, this effort focuses on investigating the security
measures built into ROS 2, which relies on third party
communication middleware using DDS.
B. DDS and its Security
The security of ROS 2 is highly reliant on the security of
its DSS communication protocol; hence, our analysis focuses
heavily on evaluating the implementation and efficiency of
DDS in ROS 2. The DDS protocol aims to realize a fast
publish-subscribe system between multiple ROS 2 nodes.
Historically, the DDS specification relied on secure networks,
i.e., there was no authentication, encryption, or access control
measures in place. OMG has recently produced a security
standard [3] to add new security compliance points to the
DDS specification, however, as we show, there are still
some inconsistencies between that specification and resulting
applications for at least one implementation.
The security standard for DDS implements a three-way
handshake consisting of HandshakeRequest, Handshak-
eReply and HandshakeFinal messages. It identifies par-
ticipants based on certificates using Public Key Infrastruc-
TABLE I: Specification of test machines
Machine names MPub MSub
Host OS Windows 10 Windows 10
Guest OS Ubuntu 16.04 LTS Ubuntu 16.04 LTS
Memory (Total(Guest)) 16 GB (4GB) 4 GB (2GB)
Total CPUs Intel i5-7740HQ Intel N42002.80 GHz (8 Cores) 1.10 GHz (8 Cores)
Guest CPUs 2.80 GHz (4 Cores) 1.10 GHz (4 Cores)
Installed VPN module Client Server
ture (PKI) and uses the Diffie-Hellman (DH) key exchange
protocol. As an example, consider two participants where a
handshake is made in the following way:
1) HandshakeRequest message is sent by Participant
1 to initiate the key agreement protocol. It contains
Participant 1’s certificate information, a DH public key,
and a random nonce.
2) HandshakeReply message is sent by Participant 2 in
response to the HandshakeRequest message. It contains
Participant 2’s certificate information, a DH public
key, Participant 1’s random nonce, as well as another
random nonce. The message is used to verify Partici-
pant 2’s receipt since the whole message is signed by
Participant 2.
3) HandshakeFinal message is sent by Participant 1 to
confirm the receipt of HandshakeReply. It contains
both nonces and is signed by Participant 1.
After the handshake, the DDS protocol uses AES-GCM
to encrypt and decrypt the data on a secure channel. It
may also provide additional reader-specific message authen-
tication codes using Galois MAC (AES-GMAC) [23]. The
AES-GCM transformation produces both the ciphertext and
a Message Authentication Code (MAC) using the same
secret key. After a shared secret is established and both
nonces were exchanged between two participants using the
handshake protocol, participants can build master secrets
using the HMAC-Based Key Derivation Function (HKDF)
recommended by IETF RFC 5869 [24]. When implemented
to the specification, this is sufficient to protect clear text
and ensure data integrity. However, when not implemented
to the specification, there is a looming question of data
integrity. In this work, we show that both ROS 2 and
the default DDS middleware could benefit from additional
security considerations to better protect data integrity.
III. EVALUATION FRAMEWORK
The DDS protocol offers a local publish/subscribe system
into ROS 2 applications for low latency communication.
However, the performance of the DDS protocol may vary
depending on its implementation. According to eProsima
[4], one can achieve a high throughput and a low latency,
both desirable properties for the real-time operations. In
this section, we provide a framework for performing the
benchmark evaluation in various combinations of network
and security settings to reflect the real word applications.
We used two machines, called MPub and MSub. Their
specifications are summarized in Table I, in the experiments
in Section IV to test throughput and latency performance.
A. Performance Metrics
To measure the communication efficiency, we define two
performance metrics:
1) Estimated Latency is a delay based on a round-trip
time of a packet. Algorithms 1 and 2 show pseudocode
to measure the Estimated Latency. A publisher mea-
sures the time taken from publishing the message (T1)
to subscribing the same message (T2), and computes
the latency by calculating (T2−T1)/2. The subscriber
is a simple node that publishes the subscribed message
to the other channel as soon as it is received. We use a
round trip latency since measuring one-way latency re-
quires two machines with highly synchronized clocks,
which is quite difficult to build and verify when there
is a very small latency (< 1 ms).
2) Estimated Throughput is the number of bits per second
measured by a publisher. A publisher node sends a
certain number of packets to a subscriber node without
receiving any reply and measures the time it takes
to send all those packets. After sending the packets,
the publisher receives the number of successfully re-
ceived packets from the sender. The throughput is then
calculated using the ratio of the number of received
packets × the size of a packet and the time taken
to send all of the packets. Due to the difficulty of
synchronizing the clocks on two machines, we measure
the throughput for only the publisher. However, we
also consider packet loss since the DDS protocol has
a ‘UDP-like’ property. That is, it does not guarantee
packet delivery since the data on this pub/sub system
is designed for multicast real-time transmission.
To avoid packet loss caused by the traffic congestion, we
have included a ‘cooling-off’ period after sending a packet.
For example, in Algorithm 3, we include a 1ms sleep cycle
for each transmission to avoid congestion. Setting this value
is critical to the measurement of throughput since a long
cooling-off period will guarantee almost 100% delivery of
packets, but will cause the throughput to decrease. A short
cooling-off period will also decrease the throughput as more
packets will be dropped. We set the cooling-off period at 1
ms based on our experimental observation. With this cooling-
off period, the small packets (16 bytes) are almost always
delivered successfully, whilst the larger packets are dropped
more frequently, but not often. Moreover, to measure the
exact throughput, the publisher has to know the number of
packets that are successfully delivered to the subscriber. A
publisher sending “START” and “DONE” messages allows
a subscriber to count the number of packets successfully
subscribed as shown in Algorithms 3 and 4.
B. Performance Benchmark Scenarios
We test the latency and throughput performance on two
network settings:
• Wired: We connect two machines directly using an
Ethernet cable. Each ROS 2 implementation is on a
virtual machine in VirtualBox. We use a “Bridged
Algorithm 1 Latency (Publish)
1: procedure LATENCY PUB(m size, topic1, topic2)
2: Generate an m size sized random message msg
3: T1 = current time()
4: Publish msg on topic1
5: Subscribe msgr on topic2
6: if msg == msgr then
7: T2 = current time()
8: return latency = (T2 − T1)/2
Algorithm 2 Latency (Subscribe)
1: procedure LATENCY SUB(topic1, topic2)
2: while TRUE do
3: Subscribe msg on topic1
4: Publish msg on topic2
adapter”, attached to the Ethernet Network Interface
Card (NIC), to allow for the network connections.
• Wireless: We connect two machines wirelessly without
using an extra access point. For the connection, we set
MPub as an access point and MSub as a device con-
nected to MPub using the “Mobile Hostpot” function.
We could not use the ad-hoc protocol since this feature
is deleted in Windows 10. We turned on “Network
discovery” to allow the bidirectional communication in
the Windows network setting. “Bridged adapters” to the
wireless NICs are used for both machines.
We estimate the performances using various forms of
communication security, which cover most of the remote
access situations:
1) No Security: In this scenario, ROS 2 and its publish
and subscribe system (i.e., DDS system) do not use any
security functions to protect communications. There-
fore, all communications between the nodes in two
different machines are plain text and can be monitored
by other nodes or adversaries.
2) Cryptographic Algorithms: In this scenario, Secure
ROS 2 (SROS2) [22] is used to encrypt its communica-
tion channel as guided by OMG [3]. SROS is a package
that provides the tools and instructions to use ROS 2
on top of DDS-Security (i.e., any DDS middleware).
The intent of SROS2 is to provide a reasonable security
infrastructure while minimizing user disruptions such
as computational overhead and API breakage (note
that SROS1 is proposed to be included in the ROS
1 API [25]). Accordingly, SROS2 with eProsima’s
Fast RTPS are evaluated to measure the overhead by
encrypting/decrypting communication traffic.
3) SSL/TLS: In this scenario, an encrypted channel be-
tween two nodes is established in advance through
OpenVPN. The setting similar to Scenario 1 (No
Security), but the communication is secured using VPN
technology. The VPN connection uses “AES-128-CBC
for “cipher” and “SHA256 for “auth” options.
Algorithm 3 Throughput (Publish)
1: procedure THROUGHPUT PUB(s, d, topic1, topic2)
2: throughput = 0
3: Generate an s sized random message msg
4: Publish “START” on topic1 and Sleep(100ms)
5: clock = current time() and i = 0
6: while i < d do
7: Publish msg on topic1
8: i = i+ 1 and Sleep(1ms)
9: clock = clock − current time()
10: Sleep(100ms) and Publish “DONE” on topic1
11: Subscribe to result on topic2
12: throughput = calculate bps(s, res, clock)
13: return throughput
Algorithm 4 Throughput (Subscribe)
1: procedure THROUGHPUT SUB(topic1, topic2)
2: rPKT = 0
3: while TRUE do
4: Subscribe msg on topic1
5: if msg == “Start” then
6: rPKT = 0
7: else if msg == “Done” then
8: Publish rPKT on topic2
9: rPKT = 0
10: else
11: rPKT = rPKT + 1
IV. BENCHMARK RESULT AND ANALYSIS
In the first experiment, the two nodes are connected via
an Ethernet cable, while in the second experiment they are
connected using Wi-Fi. The ways in which the estimated
latency and estimated throughput is measured are identical
in these scenarios. For the latency test, we generated various
sized packets, from 16 bytes to 12,000 bytes, and repeated
each test 1,000 times to obtain the estimated latency. The
throughput is measured in a similar way to that of latency
over varying packet sizes. We sent 100 packets per test and
repeated the tests 100 times for the estimation.
A. Performance on Wired Network
1) Estimated Latency: Figure 1a displays the estimated
latency for our scenarios. The DDS service (i.e., eProsima
Fast RTPS) shows a low latency even when two nodes are
remotely connected. Also, the latency is almost independent
to the size of the packet if it is not encrypted. However,
the encryption causes a delay that increases with the size
of the packet. The most dramatic change is observed when
using SROS2, where the latency is almost doubled in some
instances. The use of a VPN can reduce this by more than
half in the best case.
2) Estimated Throughput: Figures 2a and 3a show the
throughput of the ROS 2 application in a wired network.
The figures show that the encryption in a ROS 2 application
using SROS2 may cause a significant loss in throughput
when compared to a connection with no security. It can also
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Fig. 1: Latency per packet size in wired and wireless net-
works.
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Fig. 2: Throughput per packet size in wired and wireless
networks.
be seen that the VPN connection significantly outperforms
SROS2 in most cases, and this performance gap can increase
with packet size.
B. Performance on Wireless Network
1) Estimated Latency: Figure 1b shows the results from
latency testing on a wireless network. We observed that using
SROS2 can cause a significant delay in the network that
increases with packet size, whilst the use of a VPN merely
affects the latency of the packet delivery.
2) Estimated Throughput: Figure 2b shows the through-
put of the ROS 2 application in a wireless network. Similar
to the latency results, we observed that using a VPN does
not seriously affect the throughput in DDS, however using
SROS2 causes a significant delay.
Figure 3b shows the loss of throughput caused by a VPN
and SROS2 when compared to the no security scenario. The
overhead associated with the use of a VPN vanished by end
of the cooling-off period between packets sent (any loss is
relatively small). Similar to the wired network, the overhead
associated with the use of cryptographich algorithms reduces
the throughput almost by half.
C. Discussion
Our results show that using a VPN is more efficient
when two machines are connected, securely. It should be
noted that the experiments only look at the connection
between two machines, which may be used for emulating the
communication between a controller and a CPS or between
two CPSs. Unlike the DDS security protocol, a traditional
VPN system has a server and client structure. All clients
are connected to a server for the secure communication
and therefore, the traffic is centralized to the VPN server.
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Fig. 3: Throughput ratio against No Security in wired and
wireless networks. Here the y-axis shows the ratio between
using cryptographic algorithms and SSL/TLS to secure the
communication with the throughput from no security.
The DDS Security protocol does not have a server, but is
instead designed for the secure connection between multiple
distributed nodes. So it provides more decentralized features
than a VPN. Each node has equal privilege, therefore the
security communication cannot be disabled by compromising
only a single machine in the system. Accordingly, SROS
can be effective at providing communication security and
resilience over multiple ROS 2 nodes when the use of a
VPN is not desirable.
V. FURTHER SECURITY ANALYSIS IN IMPLEMENTATION
In addition to the benchmark results on DDS and VPN
security, we consider how the security functions of ROS 2
are properly implemented. Although the ROS community has
released the non-beta version of ROS 2, the implementation
of DDS Security of ROS 2 is still not mature. We performed
a static code analysis on the DDS security implementation of
ROS 2 (Ardent Apalone), particularly on eProsima’s RTPS
(the default installed with ROS 2). We found some notable
problems in DDS Security specification and implementation.
A. Forward Secrecy
In the DDS protocol, only two types of algorithms,
“DH+MODP-2048-256” and “ECDH+prime256v1-CEUM”,
are supported. These handshake algorithms (DH and ECDH)
do not support forward secrecy (FS). In cryptography, FS
is a property of secure communication protocols in which
the compromise of any long-term keys also compromises
past session keys. Since the DH public key is fixed in the
certificate and its corresponding private key is also fixed,
all past session keys can be computed by an adversary if a
long-term private key is compromised and all past traffic was
recorded by the adversary.
An easy way to support FS is to not use DH parameters
as a long-term key. This is usually denoted as “DHE” in the
SSL and TLS protocol, where DH parameters are generated
for every new connection. The adversary then cannot com-
pute the key used in past communications. Applying this
protocol does not change a program much because DDS
already supports all cryptographic algorithms that the change
requires, but adopting this protocol certainly improves ROS
2 security. This lack of stronger security option does not
belong to the specific eProsima implementation, rather, the
deficiency exists in the OMG DDS security specification [3].
B. Static Code Analysis
We used Cppcheck [26] as a static analysis tool to report
any notable errors within the ROS 2 Ardent Apalone source
code. The resulting report detailed 19 errors with 12 false
positives and only the remaining seven errors requiring closer
observation to be fixed.
• Two errors are found in the eProsima RTPS. One error
is caused by skipping initialization of a variable while
the other is caused by skipping the freeing of a variable.
• An error is found in the ROS Middleware Interface
(RMW) which potentially prints out a NULL pointer.
• Four errors are found in RViz which relate to problems
in memory management and can potentially cause a
memory leakage.
While the specifics of the errors are not particularly notable,
the process of employing a static code analysis tool is an
important part of verifying the security of a CPS. Recently,
DeMarinis et al. [6] showed that they were able to find over
100 publicly-accessible hosts running ROS while scanning
for open IP addresses. They even unintentionally found two
of their own robots as part of the scan (one Baxter robot
and one drone). Similar to their study, this study echos
the necessity of understanding the security settings when
deploying a robot so that an adversary cannot access or
control a robot capable of being remotely moved in ways
dangerous both to the robot and the objects around it.
C. Inconsistency between DDS Specification and RTPS
We found two main inconsistencies between the DDS
specification [3] and its implementation:
1) There is a mandated 96 bit sized initial vector (IV) to
be used in the implementation of AES-GCM (leaving
the right-most 32 bits for a counter), while the actual
size in RTPS is 128 bits. Some implementations may
not accept this parameterization by default.
2) A random number generator to generate challenges
for master keys must be compliant with the NIST
recommendation [27]. However, we observed that the
current implementation relies only on the BN rand
function that is provided by the OpenSSL library and
does not comply with [27].
D. Discussion
We observed that the eProsima RTPS relies highly on the
OpenSSL library. The OpenSSL community already provides
a reliably secure version of the library, which is the OpenSSL
FIPS objective module. Replacing the general OpenSSL
library with the FIPS validated module may greatly improve
the security of the current implementation and also provide
the security functions which is currently deficient such as
zeroization of secret data.
We also formally verified DDS handshake protocol using
ProVerif [28], which is automated protocol verifier. We could
not find any problems on the protocol. It means that the
correctness of the security protocol is verifiable.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we discuss the ROS 2 security features
and evaluate them in terms of impact on performance. We
discussed two possible settings that ROS 2 can use to protect
their communication in practice and measure their effects on
latency and throughput performances. Particularly, we build
our own ROS 2 applications to test those parameters over
various settings by combining wired and wireless networks.
Our results show that using a reliable VPN application is
a better choice so far if an application of ROS 2 requires a
simple system architecture, such as a CPS with a controller or
a centralized server-client architecture. In addition to the poor
performance when compared to the VPN, we also observe
that the accuracy of the DDS security implementation to
the specification should not be assumed as correct. After
analyzing the default DDS middleware with ROS 2 we found
that it did not conform to the security specification by OMG.
This can cause a CPS to be left in vulnerable situations.
ROS 2 is still under rapid development with updated
versions being published every few months. Continuously
monitoring the implementation of ROS 2 to check violations
to the relevant security specifications and logical errors,
which can be linked to potential vulnerabilities is greatly
beneficial to enhance the security of ROS 2. Since ROS
2 is a software library, its applications may vary; therefore
the heterogeneity of ROS 2 applications makes confirming
the security of applications difficult. Developing the tools
and procedures that enable developers to deploy during and
after the development process will reduce the risk of security
vulnerabilities of resulting CPS systems.
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